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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
       
We consider a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly model in order to 
analyze  both  intra-  and  inter-platform  competition  in  an  always  corvered 
broadband  access  market  (Copper-Copper,  Copper-FTTH  and  FTTH-FTTH 
competitions). The model is purely static and does not address dynamic efficiency 
issues. It shows that the access charges play a significant role in the migration 
from  copper  to  FTTH  and  in  FTTH  investment  incentives,  provided  that 
consumers are segmented. In FTTH-infrastructure-based competition, investment 
incentives tend to increase with the copper access charge, while in FTTH-service-
based competition, FTTH investment incentives are much more sensitive to the 
FTTH access charge than to the copper access charge. A comparison of FTTH-
infrastructure-based and FTTH-service-based competition in terms of nationwide 
FTTH  coverage  and  social  welfare  indicates  that  FTTH-infrastructure-based 
competition  leads  to  a  higher  level  of  nationwide  FTTH  coverage  and  social 
welfare.  
1  Introduction 
 
The impact of broadband access regulations on competition and investment is a crucial 
issue, whose consequences are increasing with the rise of Next Generation Access 
Networks (NGN).  
The  tension  between  promoting  competition  and  investment  incentives  has  already 
been noted in economics literature.  Laffont and Tirole, (2000) underline the trade-off 
between promoting competition, which increases social welfare once infrastructure is in 
place, and investment incentives, which are used to improve or simply maintain the 
infrastructure. 
Kalmus and Wiethaus, (2007) have developed a model which describes the impact of 
access charges in different regulatory regimes.       
Like Laffont and Tirole, they distinguish between infrastructures which are already in 
place and investments in new infrastructures, or upgrading existing infrastructures. In 
the case of existing infrastructures, they concluded that an access charge set at cost is 
the best way to maximize social welfare. For new infrastructures or upgrades, on the 
other hand, they concluded that an access charge set at cost is inefficient. The optimal 
access charge is higher than marginal costs.  
In the first case, investments are not needed. The regulator simply maximizes the static 
efficiency of the infrastructure. In the second case, however, investments are needed 
and operators, including both existing operators and their rivals, must be encouraged to 
invest. A low access charge does not provide enough returns to investors and allows 
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competitors to obtain access at low costs. They have also shown that investments and 
consumer surplus both increased with access charge. 
More  recently,  Nitsche  and  Wiethaud  (2010)  have  focused  on  the  specific  case  of 
investments in NGNs. They concluded that the best regime was the “Fully Distributed 
Costs”  (FDC)  system,  which  maximizes  the  consumer  surplus  and  “Risk sharing”  in 
order to maximize investment. These regulatory regimes are more efficient than a simple 
access charge set at cost, known as the “Long Run Incremental Cost” (LRIC) system.  
In recent decades, regulatory regimes, particularly in Europe, have been more focused 
on  promoting  competition  than  on  investment  incentives,  in  line  with  the  “ladder  of 
investment”  theory  of  (Cave,  2006).    Kalmus  and  Wiethaus  (2007)  explain  the 
regulators’ behavior: 
 
“At the time when those investments were made, telecoms companies were usually 
state-owned monopolies. Therefore, regulators did not need to worry about negatively 
affecting investment incentive. From a consumer welfare point of view, they maximized 
consumer welfare by forcing access at cost” 
 
This behavior has clearly made it possible to shake off competition from state owned 
monopolies,  but  the  ladder  of  investment  theory's  efficiency  has  been  called  into 
question. A paper (Bourreau, Dogan, & Manant, 2009) noted that competitors seem to 
be stuck on the first rungs of the ladder of investment. 
A growing current of thought, particularly in the USA, emphasizes the investment side 
and the overall dynamic effects of regulatory regimes. Bauer and Bohlin (2008) have 
observed a trend which moves from static to dynamic regulation. This new regulatory 
behavior is explained by the need to boost investments in order to upgrade the existing 
copper infrastructure. 
Empirical  studies  highlight  the  impact  of  access  charge  regulation  on  investments. 
Waverman, Meschi, Reillier, and Dasgupta (2007) have shown that a low copper access 
charge  encouraged  intra-platform  competition  (DSL  competition  only)  but  hampered 
inter-platform competition (competition among DSL and cable or FTTx operators) and 
hence investment. They argue that, in the long run, its negative effects on inter-platform 
investment override its beneficial effects on intra-platform competition. 
As  Kalmus et al. have observed, investment, which allows inter-platform competition, 
acts  over  the  long  term.  This  is  a  dynamic  effect  and  its  impact  depends  on  the 
investments effects on consumers’ willingness to pay. Jeanjean (2010) highlights that 
the dynamic effect of investments depends on the potential of technological progress 
and is inversely proportional to the static efficiency of competition in maximizing welfare.  
A paper by Brito, Pereira, and Vareda (2010) analyzed the incentives to invest according 
to  the  degree  of  improvement  perceived  by  consumers  between  an  old  technology 
(copper) and a new technology (fiber). If only the incumbent operator can invest, when 
the  improvement  is  non-drastic  it  may  be  induced  to  give  access  to  the  entering 
operator. Furthermore, when the improvement is small and non-drastic, a duopoly on 
the  retail  market  is  socially  optimal,  while  when  the  improvement  is  non-drastic  but 
large, a monopoly on the retail market is socially optimal. In this case  the decrease in 
welfare caused by a decline in the level of competition is smaller than the decrease 
caused by the high level of the fiber access charge paid by the newcomer. When the 
improvement is drastic, the incumbent operator does not give access to the newcomer. 
The  solution  might  be  regulating  the  fiber  access  charge,  but  this  may  deter 
investments. If both firms can invest, but only one does, it is more likely that the entrant 
is the one which invests. 
 
This  paper  aims  to  examine  the  trade-off  between  static  efficiency,  which  is  the 
advantage  of  cost-oriented  access  charges,  and  dynamic  efficiency,  which  is  the   3 
advantage of higher access charge. The paper's originality consists in dealing with intra-
platform  and  inter-platform  competition  at  the  same  time.  It  models  competition 
between the incumbent operator, which owns the copper infrastructure, and its rival, 
which buys access from the incumbent. Both the incumbent and its rival may build a 
new  FTTH  infrastructure  which  allows  enhanced  services,  which  in  turn  increase 
consumers' willingness to pay. This new infrastructure may or may not be regulated by 
a  fiber  access  charge.  The  model  investigates  both  the  level  of  the  copper  access 
charge and, if necessary, the fiber access charge.  
Our investigation is divided into six sections. In section 2, a horizontally and vertically 
differentiated duopoly model is introduced (Shaked & Sutton, 1987). In section 3, we 
attempt  to  determine  the  FTTH  investment  incentives  in  FTTH-infrastructure-based 
competition.  The  interdependence  of  investment  incentives  and  access  charges  in 
FTTH-service-based  competition  is  demonstrated  in  section  4.  Nationwide  FTTH 
coverage, consumer surplus and social welfare are determined in section 5 and FTTH-
infrastructure-based  and  FTTH-service-based  competition  are  compared.  Section 
contains our concluding remarks. 
2  The linear model 
 
In the following section, a two-player, four-offer model is introduced (Shaked & Sutton, 
1987) 
 
The two players are a vertically integrated firm -the incumbent which owns the copper 
network - and its rival. In order to analyze the role of the copper access charge, each 
operator is able to offer Internet access through either technology, but only the copper 
access  charge  is  regulated.  The  incumbent  manages  the  copper  infrastructure, 
provides a copper offer, and possibly a FTTH offer, if it decides to invest. The rival 
provides a copper offer by paying an access charge to the incumbent and possibly, if it 
decides to invest, a FTTH offer by investing in a fiber infrastructure.  
 
We assume that the consumer’s utility to be connected to the network, whatever the 
technology, is V. The fiber network is supposed to provide higher quality than copper. 
We assume that the difference of utility between copper and fiber isq . The incumbent 
incurs a marginal cost c for the copper offer for both the retail and wholesale markets. 
Both firms incur the same marginal cost  f c  for the fiber offer. 
The two firms are differentiated à la Hotelling, with the transportation cost t. The two 
technologies are differentiated vertically with the parameter h. We illustrate this in the 
following figure with two axes of differentiation on a two-dimensional surface. 
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Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 1 1 1 1 Market share of incumbent copper, rival copper, incumbent FTTH and rival FTTH  Market share of incumbent copper, rival copper, incumbent FTTH and rival FTTH  Market share of incumbent copper, rival copper, incumbent FTTH and rival FTTH  Market share of incumbent copper, rival copper, incumbent FTTH and rival FTTH       
 
Competition  between  firms  is  represented  by  the  horizontal  axis  and  competition 
between technologies by the vertical axis. The incumbent is located at abscissa 0 and 
the rival at abscissa 1. The copper technology is located at ordinate 0 and the fiber 
technology at ordinate 1. The market size is normalized to 1, i.e. sic+ src+ sif+ srf   = 1 
where sic , src ,sif , sry   respectively represent the market share of incumbent copper, rival 
copper, incumbent fiber and rival fiber offers. 
 
We  assume  that  the  constant  V  is  high  enough  to  ensure  that  the  market  is  fully 
covered.  q  corresponds to the average consumer valuation of the fiber technology. 
Consumers who purchase a fiber offer increase their utility by q. Consumers who are 
located  at  ordinate y   incur  a  disutility  of  ) 2 1 ( y h - so  they  increase  their  utility 
by ) 2 1 ( y h - - q . 
The  utility  of  a  consumer  located  at  (x,y),  who  purchases  an  access  is  ic U   for  the 
incumbent copper offer,  rc U  for the rival copper offer,  if U  for the incumbent fiber offer 
and  rf U   for  the  rival  fiber  offer.  The  offer  prices  are  denoted  respectively: 
rf rc if ic p p p p ; ; ; . 
 
The different utilities are written: 
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When t is high, operators are highly differentiated, when t is low, operators are highly 
substitutable and competition is fierce. 
When h is high, the technologies are very vertically differentiated, and consumers see 
fiber  and  copper  as  very  different.  In  other  words,  consumers  are  segmented  (or 
distributed) according their access technology preference. When h is low, consumers all 
have a tendency to adopt the same behavior.    5 
Two cases are particularly relevant to understanding the impact of access charges on 
investment incentives. 
The first case is  0 = h . In this case, consumers all adopt the same behavior, and will all 
choose a fiber offer as soon as it is available because of the premium q  it provides.  
The second case is  0 = t , a perfect competition between firms. 
 
 
In this study, we distinguish between two types of competition for FTTH offers:  
·  FTTH-infrastructure-based  competition,  only  the  FTTH  network  owner  can 
propose FTTH offers 
·  FTTH-service-based competition, the FTTH network owner can or must offer 
wholesale FTTH access to competitors through a FTTH access charge 
 
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition              
 
Given that the copper access charge provides revenues for the incumbent and 
generates costs for the rival, profits expressions are as follow (in case of both 
firms invest in FTTH) 
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Where c c c c:  marginal cost of copper access 
  a a a ac c c c:  copper access charge 
  c c c cf f f f: : : :    marginal cost of FTTH 
  f f f f:  :  :  :         fixed cost of FTTH deployment 
 
The prices at equilibrium are calculated as follows:  
 
-  The incumbent maximizes the sum of the profits  ( if ic i p p p + =  ) 
with respect to p p p pic ic ic ic and p p p pif if if if 
-  The  rival  maximizes  the  sum  of  the  profits  ( rf rc r p p p + =   )  with 
respect to p p p prc rc rc rc       and p p p prf rf rf rf 
 
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition       
 
The  profit  expressions  differ  depending  on  which  player  invests  in  FTTH.  If  the 
incumbent invests in FTTH and the rival proposes an FTTH offer by paying an FTTH 
access charge to the incumbent, the profit expressions become: 
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Where a a a af f f f: FTTH access charge   6 
 
If the rival invests in FTTH and the incumbent proposes an FTTH offer by paying an 
FTTH access charge to the rival,  the profit expressions become: 
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Determination of investment strategy  Determination of investment strategy  Determination of investment strategy  Determination of investment strategy        
       
In order to determine the dominant FTTH investment strategy for the incumbent and the 
rival, a payoff table is created for the four situations, referred to as NN NN NN NN, NI NI NI NI, IN IN IN IN and II  II  II  II. 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
No  No  No  No incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
investment investment investment investment       
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Table  Table  Table  Table 1 1 1 1 Payoff table for   Payoff table for   Payoff table for   Payoff table for NN, NI, IN, II NN, NI, IN, II NN, NI, IN, II NN, NI, IN, II 
 
NN NN NN NN corresponds to a situation where nobody invests: only two copper offers exist on 
the broadband market. One copper offer is provided by the incumbent who owns the 
copper  network  and  the  other  by  the  rival  who  buys  the  copper  line  by  paying  an 









i p p p p > > & . This expression means that neither the incumbent nor 
the rival has incentives to invest alone. 
 
NI NI NI NI       corresponds to a situation where the rival invests alone: two copper offers and one 
FTTH offer (or two FTTH offers) exist on the broadband market in FTTH-infrastructure-
based  competition  (FTTH-service-based  competition).  In  FTTH-service-based 
competition,  FTTH  access  can  be  offered  by  both  firms:  first  by  the  rival  who  has 
invested in FTTH and then by the incumbent who buys FTTH access by paying an 









i p p p p > > & . This expression means that the rival has an incentive to 
invest alone while the incumbent has no incentive to invest when the rival invests.  
 
IN IN IN IN       corresponds to a situation where the incumbent invests alone: two copper offers and 
one  FTTH  offer  (or  two  FTTH  offers)  exist  on  the  broadband  market  in  FTTH-
infrastructure-based competition (FTTH-service-based competition). As for NI NI NI NI, in FTTH-
service-based  competition,  FTTH  access  can  be  offered  by  both  firms:  first  by  the 
incumbent who has invested in FTTH and then by the rival who buys FTTH access by 









i p p p p > > & .  This  expression  means  that  the  incumbent  has  an 




II II II II       corresponds to a situation where both firms invest: two ADSL offers and two FTTH 
offers exist on the broadband market. The incumbent and the rival are therefore in 
competition for ADSL in terms of services and in competition for FTTH in terms of 
facilities. The incumbent and the rival both maximize the sum of their ADSL and FTTH 








i p p p p > > & . This expression means 
that the incumbent and the rival are both encouraged to invest when the other is 
investing. 
 
In the same manner, we are able to determine the FTTH investment strategy based on 
the actions and reactions of both firms in the four situations described above. We will 
call this maximum amount of investment
j
i f .  With i, the firm  { } R I i , Î  and j the number 
of firms which invest  1 = j  if the firm invests alone and  2 = j when both firms invest. 
 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
No  No  No  No incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent       
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Table  Table  Table  Table 2 2 2 2 Action  Action  Action  Actions s s s and reaction  and reaction  and reaction  and reactions s s s of the incum  of the incum  of the incum  of the incumbent and the  bent and the  bent and the  bent and the rival for rival for rival for rival for       NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN, II IN, II IN, II IN, II       
 
A  positive 
1
i f   means  that  the  incumbent  invests  in  FTTH  when  the  rival  does  not 
(incumbent’s  investment  action).  A  positive
1
r f   means  that  the  rival  invests  in  FTTH 
when the incumbent does not (the rival’s investment action). A positive 
2
i f means that 
the  incumbent  invests  in  FTTH  when  the  rival  does  (the  incumbent’s  investment 
reaction).A positive
2
r f means that the rival invests in FTTH when the incumbent does 
(the rival’s investment reaction).  
 
NN NN NN NN  is  a  dominant  strategy  when 0 & 0








i i f f p p p p .  This 
expression means that no firm invests 
NI NI NI NI  is  a  dominant  strategy  when 0 & 0








r r f f p p p p .  This 
expression means that the rival invests and the incumbent does not react, meaning that 
the rival invests alone. 
IN IN IN IN  is  a  dominant  strategy  when 0 & 0








i i f f p p p p .  This 
expression means that the incumbent’s investment action is confirmed and the rival’s 
reaction is absent, meaning that the incumbent invests alone.   8 
II II II II is a dominant strategy when 0 & 0








r r f f p p p p . This expression 
means  that  when  a  firm  invests,  whether  it  is  the  incumbent  or  the  rival,  the  other 
reacts, meaning that both firms invest. 
 
Which  of  the  four  situations  NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  ,  NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  ,  IN IN IN IN  and   and   and   and  II   II   II   II  is  a  dominant  strategy?  The  answer 
depends  on  two  parameters.  In  FTTH-infrastructure-based  competition,  it  mainly 
depends  on  the copper  access  charge, c a ,  and fixed  FTTH  deployment cost  f .  In 
FTTH-service-based  competition,  it  mainly  depends  on  the  FTTH  access  charge, 
f a and fixed FTTH deployment cost f .  
 
This is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the regulator sets the copper access 
charge c a .  In  the  second  stage,  both  players  decide  whether  to  invest  in  the  fiber 
infrastructure.  In  the  third  stage,  players  compete  on  the  retail price  of copper  and 
possibly  fiber.  The  game  is  studied  for  a  given  area,  with  a  given  fixed  FTTH 
infrastructure cost f f f f, which is assumed to be equal for both firms. As usual, the game is 
solved by backward induction. By comparing each player’s profits, with and without 
fiber investment, we are able to determine fiber investment incentives. 
 
3  Model resolution in FTTH-infrastructure-based 
competition 
 
Three cases are studied in this section. Subsection 3.1 analyses the case where copper 
and FTTH are seen as fully substitutable technologies with h=0. Subsection 3.2 
analyses a perfect competition with t=0. Subsection 3.3 analyses imperfect competition 
in a segmented market with t > 0 and h > 0. The latter case is a generic case where we 
use numerical simulation to solve the model.  
3.1  Fully substitutable technologies h=0 
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The equilibrium may be different depending on whether the incumbent or the rival 
invests or both invest. 
 
3.1.1  No firm invests 
 
In this case, fiber offers are not available, consumers can choose only between the 
incumbent and rival’s copper offers. 
 Market share is written: 
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Profits depend on access charge  c a  and copper marginal cost c: 
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We  can  observe  that  the  rival’s  profit  does  not  depend  on  copper  access  charge 
because  the  rival can pass  along  the  price  burden  and  preserve  its margin  without 
reducing its market share. This is not possible when at least one fiber offer is available. 
 


















. This reduces the incumbent’s incentive to invest when access 
charge increases. 
             
3.1.2  Only the incumbent invests 
 
In this case, the incumbent’s consumers all choose the fiber offer  while the rival’s 
consumers  all  choose  the  copper  offer.  While  all  of  its  consumers  have  migrated 
towards fiber, the incumbent continues to receive revenues from the wholesale market.  
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Let us denote  q w + - = f c c  which represents the benefits of fiber as compared to 
copper. This is the marginal cost difference plus the consumers’ utility difference. In 
order to ensure that the market is fully covered we assume h 3 £ w . 
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An increase in access charge increases the incumbent’s profit and has no effect on the 
rival’s profit. 
 
3.1.3  Only the rival invests 
 
In this case, the rival’s consumers all choose the fiber offer while the incumbent’s 
consumers all choose the copper offer. The incumbent thus no longer receives 
revenues from the wholesale market. 
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A first order condition leads to equilibrium prices: 
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An increase in access charge has no effect either on either firm. 
 
3.1.4  Both firms invest 
 
In this case, consumers all choose the fiber offer, no matter which firm they choose, 
and as in the previous case, the incumbent receives no revenues from the wholesale 
market. 
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An increase in access charge has no effect on either firm. It is interesting to note that 
despite the increase in consumer utility provided by fiber, the incumbent's profits are 
lower than in the case where neither firm invests, while the rival's profits are the same.   12 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        R R R Rival ival ival ival investment  investment  investment  investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 3 3 3 3 Market share table for   Market share table for   Market share table for   Market share table for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN, II  IN, II  IN, II  IN, II for h=0 for h=0 for h=0 for h=0 (  (  (  (       FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition       ) ) ) )       
 
3.1.5  Investment Incentives  
 
The following payoff table summarizes the incumbent and rival’s profits in four situations 




        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
No  No  No  No incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Ta Ta Ta Table  ble  ble  ble 4 4 4 4 payoff table for   payoff table for   payoff table for   payoff table for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN IN IN IN,  ,  ,  , II II II II for h=0  for h=0  for h=0  for h=0 (  (  (  (       FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
       
The investment incentive is the difference between profits after investment and profits 
before investment. 
For a given area, we assume the fixed cost of investment is the same for both firms: f f f f. 
The denser the area, the lower the fixed FTTH cost f f f f. 
 

















r p p -  for the rival to invest when the incumbent invests. 
 
The maximum amount that a firm is encouraged to invest corresponds to the least 
dense area the firm is willing to cover. By using 
j
i f as defined in section 2, the actions 
and reactions of the incumbent and its rival, 
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We can observe that the access charge does not appear in equation (3-18). This means 
that investment incentives are independent of access charge. In this case, the access 
charge plays no role in the investment incentives.  
We  can  also  observe  that,  in  this  case,  the  firms  have  exactly  the  same  incentives 
whether  they  invest  alone  or  they  both  invest.  Finally,  there  are  two  thresholds  of 
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As a function of copper access charge and fixed FTTH cost, the lefthand region plot 
above indicates: 
 
In the densest areas where 
2
i f f £  both firms invest. In moderately dense areas where 
1 2
i i f f f £ £  only one firm invests (the incumbent or the rival). In the least dense areas 
where  f fi £
1 no firm invests. 
 
If only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the right region plot 
above  indicates  that  incumbent’s  investment  incentives  are  not  sensitive  to  copper 
access charge. 
 
NN NN NN NN                    f fi £
1        
I I I II I I I           
2
i f f £                    
NI or IN NI or IN NI or IN NI or IN                    1 2
i i f f f £ £        
a a a ac c c c       
f f f f       : fixed FT : fixed FT : fixed FT : fixed FTTH cost TH cost TH cost TH cost       
 IN  IN  IN  IN                    1
i f f £        
a a a ac c c c       
f f f f       : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost         14 
The benefits of fiber as compared to copper, w,  play a major role. Incentives to invest 
(alone or both) increase with w. The condition  h 3 £ w  ensures that all incentives are 
positive.  
 
Let  us  denote 
t
1
= g   which  represents  the  intensity  of  competition.  The  thresholds 
become: 
18
) 6 ( 1 gw w +
= i f  and
18
) 6 ( 2 gw w -
= i f . The intensity of competition therefore 
raises the threshold above which neither firm invests and lowers the threshold under 
which both firms invest. Competition tends to increase the area where only one firm 
invests  and  decrease  the  area  where  both  firms  invest.  When  there  is  no 




3.1.6  Discussion 
 
Why do the access charge not play a role in the investment incentives? 
If  0 = h ,  the  wholesale  market  disappears  when  the  rival  invests,  while  it  is  fully 
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In the same manner, access charge does not appear in rival’s profit expressions when 
the rival invests and they did not appear in
NN
r p . Thus the access charge does not 
appear in any of the incentive expressions, equation (3-18). 
 
We can infer that this will no longer be the case if  0 > h .  In next section, we will see 
that the rival’s incentive to invest alone increases with the access charge, while the 
incumbent’s incentive remains steady.  
 
What happens if regulator orders the firm which has invested alone to provide access to 
its competitor with a fiber access charge f a ? In next section, we will see that it will 
reduce  the  profits  of  the  firm  which  has  invested  and  thus  reduce  its  investment 
incentives.   
 
3.2  Perfect competition t=0 
 
In this case, the utility functions in equation (2-1) can be rewritten: 
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The equilibrium may differ depending on whether the incumbent or the rival invests or 
both invest.   15 
 
3.2.1  No firm invests 
 
In this case, equation (3-19) leads to 
2
1
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The rival earns no profits and the incumbent earns the difference between the 
access charge and the marginal cost. 
3.2.2  Only the incumbent invests 
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Profits at equilibrium are written: 
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We assume that  h 3 £ w in order to ensure that the copper market share is positive. 
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In this case, fiber enables the incumbent to increase its profits. As only the incumbent 
has  invested,  it  has  the  monopoly  on  fiber,  which  decreases  competition.  The 
incumbent can set its fiber price above marginal cost and thus increase its profits on 
fiber  while  maintaining  the  profits  provided  by  access  charges  on  copper.    It  is 
interesting to note that the incumbent maintains the profit provided by access charges  
not only for copper but also for fiber, because of the expression  ) ( c ac - for its fiber 
price.  The incumbent thus fully maintains its profits generated by access charges and 
can increase its profits from copper. 
The rival does not benefit from fiber and cannot increase its profits.   16 
3.2.3  Only the rival invests 
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Remark:  rc ic p p >  or rc ic p p <  does not lead to Nash equilibrium. 
 
Profits are written: 
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A first order condition leads to: 
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We assume that  ) ( 3 c a h c - - £ w in order to ensure that the copper market share is 
positive. 
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Only the rival has invested, so it has a monopoly on fiber , which alleviates competition. 
The rival can set its fiber price above marginal cost and thus increase its profits on fiber. 
Its  profits  on  copper  remain  nil.  The  copper  market  share  decreases,  reducing  the 
incumbent’s profits generated by access charges. It is relevant to note that the rival has 
captured part of the profits generated by the access charges. 
3.2.4  Both firms invest 
 
In this case, perfect competition requires that the firm set prices at marginal cost for 
fiber and copper access charges, as in subsection 3.2.1.  
Since both firms have invested, there is also perfect competition on fiber, which no 
longer alleviates competition as in subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
A  first order condition thus leads to equilibrium prices  c rc ic a p p = =  and f rf if c p p = = . 




)) ( )( (
=










                                                                                   ( ( ( (3 3 3 3- - - -27 27 27 27) ) ) )       
   17 
The rival earns no profits. The access charge generate profits for the incumbent, which 
are not only proportional to the difference between the access charge and the marginal 
cost of copper marginal ) ( c ac - , as in subsection 3.2.1, but are also proportional to the 
copper  market  share.    In  this  case,  however,  the  introduction  of  fiber  reduces  the 
copper  market  share,  thus  reducing  the  incumbent’s  profit  as  compared  to  when 
neither firm invests (subsection 3.2.1). 
 
3.2.5  Investment incentives  
 
The following payoff table summarizes the incumbent and rival’s profits in four situations 
NN NN NN NN, NI NI NI NI, IN  IN  IN  IN, II , II , II , II. . . .       
 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
No  No  No  No incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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In the densest areas where 
2
i f f £  both firms invest 
In moderately dense areas where 
1 2
i i f f f £ £  only one firm invests (the incumbent or 
the rival) 
In the less dense areas where  f fi £
1 no firm invests 
When  0 = t , as opposed to when 0 = h , access charge plays a role in the investment 
incentives.  
Access charges increase the rival's incentive to invest alone.  It should be noted that 
when  the  access  charge  is  greater  than  the  copper  marginal  cost, c ac > ,  the   18 
incumbent's incentive to invest when the rival invests 
2
i f  is negative. This means that 
the incumbent is better off when the rival invests alone than when both firms invest. The 
market share of copper is larger when the rival invests alone than when both firms 
invest, and in both cases the incumbent’s profits are generated by the access charges 
and thus depend on the market share of copper.  
The  incumbent’s  investment  incentives  alone  do  not  depend  on  the  access  charge 
because, as we saw in subsection 3.2.2, the incumbent maintains its part of the profits 
they generate. 
 
The area where neither firm invests thus decrease with the access charge, while the 
area where only the rival invests increases with the access charge and there is no area 
where both firms invest because neither the incumbent nor the rival is interested in 
investing when their competitor invests.  
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The lefthand region plot above represents the areas where neither firm invests (NN NN NN NN) ) ) ), 
only Incumbent invests (IN IN IN IN) ) ) ), only Rival invests (IN IN IN IN) ) ) ) or both firms invest (II II II II) ) ) ) as a function of 
the copper access charge and fixed FTTH costs.       
 
When only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand 
region plot above shows that the incumbent’s investment incentives are not sensitive to 
the copper access charge. 
 
The  marginal  social  surplus  generated  by  fiber,  represented  by  the  parameterw , 







fr . This is the case when w - - > c a h c . Otherwise, h tends to 
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f f f f       : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost : fixed FTTH cost       
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NN 
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3.3  Imperfect competition in a segmented market t>0 h>0  
 
 
In this section, the four situations NN NN NN NN, NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II       are again analyzed with t > 0 and h > 0. 
 t  >  0  means  that  we  are  dealing  with  imperfect  competition.  h  >  0  indicates  that 
consumers are segmented: some consumers prefer copper access and others prefer 
fiber access. The two types of access are not totally substitutable. 
 
 
3.3.1  Equilibrium price table for NN, NI, IN, II 
 
 
In this subsection, equilibrium prices for NN NN NN NN, NI NI NI NI, IN, IN, IN, IN,       II II II II are summarized in the table 





        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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In situation NN NN NN NN, the equilibrium prices (pic, prc) both increase with a a a ac c c c.  
 
In situation NI NI NI NI, the equilibrium price curves above indicate that the rival’s FTTH price is 
higher  than  both  copper  prices due  to  consumers'  increased  willingness  to  pay  for 
FTTH.  The  rival’s  copper  price  is  lower  than  the  incumbent's  in  order  to  maintain 
consumers’ demand.  All prices increase with the access charge. 
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In situation IN IN IN IN, the equilibrium price curves indicate that the incumbent’s FTTH price is 
higher than both copper prices due to consumers'  increased willingness to pay for 
FTTH.  The  rival’s  copper  price  is  lower  than  the  incumbent's  in  order  to  maintain 
consumers’ demand.  All prices increase with the access charge. 
 
In situation II II II II, the equilibrium price curves indicate that all prices increase with the 
copper access charge. When ac=c=cf, FTTH prices are equal to copper prices. The 
FTTH prices do not reflect consumers' higher willingness to pay for FTTH, which latter is 
offset by competition between the two firms, which have both invested in FTTH. 
3.3.2  Market share table at equilibrium for NN, NI, IN, II 
 
In this subsection, the market shares at equilibrium for NN NN NN NN, NI, IN, II NI, IN, II NI, IN, II NI, IN, II       are summarized 
in the figure below 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        R R R Rival investment ival investment ival investment ival investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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In situation NN NN NN NN, the market shares of both copper offers at equilibrium are equal 
to 1/2.  
 
In situation NI NI NI NI, the market share curves above show that the market share of each 
offer is stable when access charge increases. The rival's copper market share is the 
largest.  
 
In situation IN IN IN IN, the market share curves above show that each offer's market share is 
stable when access charge increases. The rival's copper market share is the largest.  
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In  situation  II II II II,  the  market  share  curves  show  that  the  rival’s  FTTH  market  share 
increases with access charge. The market share of the rival’s copper offer decreases 
with  access  charge.  A  higher  access  charge  encourages  the  rival’s  consumers  to 
migrate from copper to FTTH. The higher willingness to pay for FTTH is expressed here 






3.3.3  Profit table at equilibrium for NN, NI, IN, II 
 
In this subsection, profits of each offer at equilibrium for NN NN NN NN, NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II  NI, IN, II are summarized 
in the table below 
 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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investment investment investment investment       
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In situation NN NN NN NN, the incumbent’s profits increase with the copper access charge 
while the rival’s profit is not sensitive to a a a ac c c c. 
 
In situation NI NI NI NI, the rival’s FTTH profits increase with the access charge, while the 
rival's copper profits are stable. Unlike the situation where t = 0 when copper offers are 
set at its marginal cost, the rival takes advantage of its monopoly on fiber. The prices 
and profits for the rival's fiber are therefore high. 
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In situation IN IN IN IN, the incumbent’s FTTH profits increase with the access charge. The 
rival’s profits, however, are stable. Unlike the situation where t = 0 when copper offers 
are set at marginal cost, the incumbent takes advantage of its monopoly on fiber. The 
prices and profits for the incumbent's fiber are therefore high. 
 
In situation II, II, II, II, the incumbent’s  copper profits and  the  incumbent and rival’s  FTTH 
profits increase with the access charge. However, the rival’s copper profits decrease 







3.3.4  Nash equilibrium to determine FTTH investment incentives 
 
In this subsection, the results of the previous subsection are summarized in a payoff 
table for each firm (instead of each offer) in order to determine each firm's dominant 
investment strategy. The sum of the profits for each firm (copper + FTTH) is shown on 
the curves below for f f f f=0. 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
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incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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It  is  clear  that the  two  situations  which  correspond  to  "Incumbent  invests  in 
FTTH and Rival does not (“IN IN IN IN”) an "the incumbent does not invest in FTTH and 
the rival does (“NI NI NI NI”) are not dominant investment strategies for f=0. One of the 
two  players  sees  its  profit  fall  when  its  competitor  invests  in  FTTH.  The  “II II II II” 
situation where the incumbent and its rival both invest in FTTH, is the dominant   23 
investment strategy in this game:   both see their profits increase provided that 
the fixed FTTH deployment cost is not too high. In other words, the reasoning 
above  is  valid  for  areas  where  FTTH  deployment  is  naturally  profitable.  An 
equilibrium with or without FTTH investment mainly depends on two parameters: 
the fixed FTTH deployment cost and copper access charge.  
 
The diagrams below show the regions NN NN NN NN, NI, IN, II NI, IN, II NI, IN, II NI, IN, II       for c = 9€/month (a typical 
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The lefthand region plot above indicates the following as a function of copper access 
charge and fixed FTTH cost: 
·  “II II II II” is located in low f areas and is almost independent of c a : when f is low 
enough, both firms invest. 
·  “IN IN IN IN”  is  located  in  higher  f   areas  and  is  almost  independent  of c a :  The 
incumbent invests in FTTH only if FTTH is exclusively reserved for its use. 
·  “NI NI NI NI”  is  located  in  higher f   areas and  increases  with c a .  A  higher  copper 
access charge encourages the rival to invest in FTTH 
·  “NN NN NN NN” is located in the highest  f  areas: when f is too high, nobody invests 
in FTTH 
 
When only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand 
region plot above shows that the incumbent’s investment incentives are not sensitive to 
copper access charge. 
4  Model resolution in FTTH-service-based 
competition  
When  the  competition  is  FTTH-service  based,  four  offers  exist  on  the  broadband 
market the  “NI NI NI NI”, “IN IN IN IN” and “II II II II” situations.  Only “NN NN NN NN” always has two offers due to the 
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NN 
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Two  cases  are  studied  in  this  section.  Subsection  4.1  analyses  the  investment 
incentives  in  a  perfect  competition  where  t=0.  Subsection  4.2  analyses  investment 
incentives in an imperfect competition within a segmented market (t > 0 and h >0). We 
will focus our study on       a a a ac c c c~c ~c ~c ~c, i.e. the level of copper access charge are near the marginal 
cost and a a a af f f f~c ~c ~c ~cf f f f, i.e. the level of FTTH access charge are near the marginal cost.  
 
 




4.1.1  Price table for NN, NI, IN, II with t=0 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 6 6 6 6 Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN, II  IN, II  IN, II  IN, II at  at  at  at t t t t=0  =0  =0  =0 ( ( ( (       FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
 
A  perfect  competition  leads  to  setting  all  prices  at  marginal  cost.  Network  owners' 
prices are aligned with their competitors'. Network owners’ prices are thus equal to the 
access charge paid by their competitors (here a a a ac c c c or a a a af f f f for copper and fiber network 
owners respectively). 
4.1.2  Market share table for NN, NI, IN, II with t=0 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investmen  investmen  investmen  investment t t t        R R R Rival ival ival ival investment  investment  investment  investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 7 7 7 7 Market share at equilibrium for   Market share at equilibrium for   Market share at equilibrium for   Market share at equilibrium for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN, II  IN, II  IN, II  IN, II at  at  at  at t t t t=0  =0  =0  =0 ( ( ( (FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
         25 
 
The market shares of copper offers increase with a a a af f f f and decrease with a a a ac c c c. Inversely, 
market  shares  of  FTTH  offers  increase  with  a a a ac c c c  and  decrease  with  a a a af f f f.  We  can  thus 
conclude that high copper access charge favors migration from copper to fiber. 
 
4.1.3  Payoff table for NN, NI, IN, II with t=0 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 8 8 8 8 Profits at equilibrium for   Profits at equilibrium for   Profits at equilibrium for   Profits at equilibrium for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI, , , , IN, II   IN, II   IN, II   IN, II at  at  at  at t t t t=0  =0  =0  =0 ( ( ( (FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
       
4.1.4  Investment incentives t=0 
 
In this subsection, the results of the payoff table are used to determine the dominant 
investment strategy for both firms.  
 
   
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 9 9 9 9 Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN IN IN IN and   and   and   and II II II II as functions of   as functions of   as functions of   as functions of a a a ac c c c       and and and and       f  f  f  f for t=0 for t=0 for t=0 for t=0       
 
The lefthand region plot above indicates the following as a function of FTTH access 
charge and fixed FTTH cost:  
a a a af f f f       
f: fixed FTTH cost f: fixed FTTH cost f: fixed FTTH cost f: fixed FTTH cost       
NI or  NI or  NI or  NI or IN IN IN IN        NI NI NI NI       
NN NN NN NN       
a a a af f f f       
f: fix f: fix f: fix f: fixed FTTH cost ed FTTH cost ed FTTH cost ed FTTH cost       
       IN IN IN IN         26 
·  The “II II II II” region is absent. A perfect competition cancels the incentives for a 
both firms to invest simultaneously.  
·  The “IN IN IN IN” region increases with FTTH access charge a a a af f f f.. 
·  The “NI NI NI NI” region also increases with the FTTH access charge a a a af f f f.. A higher 
copper access charge (a a a ac c c c>c >c >c >c) encourages the rival to invest more in FTTH 
than the incumbent. 
·  The “NN NN NN NN” region occurs for higher FTTH fixed cost f f f f:  when f f f f is too high, 
neither firm invests in FTTH. 
 
If only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand region 
plot above indicates that the incumbent’s investment incentives increase with the FTTH 
access charge. 
 
4.2  Imperfect competition t > 0 and h > 0 at ac~c, af~cf in 
FTTH-service-based competition 
 
The previous subsection shows that investment incentives for both firms increase with 
the FTTH access charge in a perfect competition. We will now examine a generic case 
where  t  >  0  and  h  >  0.  In  this  subsection, situations  “II II II II”,  “NI NI NI NI”  and  “IN IN IN IN”,  will  be 
studied with the implicit function and Taylor series. We can find the behaviors of 
equilibrium prices, the market shares and the profits for each offer at a a a ac c c c~c ~c ~c ~c and 
a a a af f f f~c ~c ~c ~cf f f f. The objective is to confirm the investment incentives with respect to a a a af f f f       and 
a a a ac c c c. 
 
4.2.1  Price table and derivatives with respect to ac and af for NN, 
NI, IN, II 
 
The equilibrium prices are calculated using the first order condition at a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f and a  a  a  ac c c c=c =c =c =c: 
 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 9 9 9 9 Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for   Equilibrium price table for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI NI NI NI,  ,  ,  , IN, II IN, II IN, II IN, II at   at   at   at t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f       (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based  based  based  based 
competition competition competition competition) ) ) )       
       
 
 




The derivative of equilibrium prices is calculated using implicit functions with respect to 
a a a ac c c c and a a a af f f f at a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f and a  a  a  ac c c c=c =c =c =c. 
The first order condition to obtain the equilibrium prices is  0 ) ), ( (
* ' = a a p p  where the 
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d p p p p
p , , , '   and  { } f c a a a , =  , we 
obtain 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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Table  Table  Table  Table 10 10 10 10 Derivatives of equilibrium prices at   Derivatives of equilibrium prices at   Derivatives of equilibrium prices at   Derivatives of equilibrium prices at t> t> t> t>0, 0, 0, 0,       h>0, a h>0, a h>0, a h>0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f              (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based  based  based  based 
competition competition competition competition) ) ) )       
       
       




















 are both positive if  0 > t and 
w > h . In the next subsection, we will see that  w > h  is necessary to have a positive 
copper  market  share.      These  positive  expressions  indicate  that  an  increase  in  the 
copper access charge leads to an increase in both prices. 
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always positive if  0 > t and w > h .  These expressions indicate that an increase in FTTH 
access charge leads to a decrease in copper prices and an increase in FTTH prices. 
 
4.2.2  Market share table and derivatives with respect to ac and af 
for NN,NI, IN, II 
 
The market share of each offer is calculated using the equilibrium prices at a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf  f  f  f and 
a a a ac c c c=c  =c  =c  =c  
 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              




























       
       
       
       
Incumbent  Incumbent  Incumbent  Incumbent 


































       
 
Table  Table  Table  Table 11 11 11 11 Market share at equilibrium at   Market share at equilibrium at   Market share at equilibrium at   Market share at equilibrium at t>0 , t>0 , t>0 , t>0 ,       h>0, a h>0, a h>0, a h>0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f       (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
       
The  table  above  shows  that  in  situations  NI NI NI NI,  IN IN IN IN and  II II II II,  the  copper  market  share  is 
positive if and only if w > h . Consumers should be sufficiently segmented for the copper 
market not to be empty. 
 
Since  market  share  is  a  function  of  prices,  using  the  results  obtained  above  for 
equilibrium prices and their derivatives at a a a ac c c c=c  =c  =c  =c and a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f, the  market share derivative of 
each offer can be calculated with respect to a a a ac c c c and a a a af f f f at a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f and a a a ac c c c=c =c =c =c:   29 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        R R R Rival investment ival investment ival investment ival investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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Table  Table  Table  Table 12 12 12 12       M M M Market share  arket share  arket share  arket share derivatives  derivatives  derivatives  derivatives at equilibrium at  at equilibrium at  at equilibrium at  at equilibrium at t>0 , h>0, a t>0 , h>0, a t>0 , h>0, a t>0 , h>0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f       (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based  based  based  based 
competition competition competition competition) ) ) )       
       



































is  always  true.    These 
positive expressions indicate that an increase in copper access charge favors FTTH 





















 are always negative. This means that an increase in FTTH access 
charge boosts copper market shares to the detriment of FTTH market shares.  
 
 
4.2.3  Payoff table and derivatives with respect to ac and af for NN, 
NI, IN, II 
 
The payoff of each offer is calculated using the equilibrium prices at a  a  a  af f f f=c =c =c =cf  f  f  f        and a  a  a  ac c c c=c  =c  =c  =c :   30 
 
 
        No  No  No  No rival rival rival rival investment  investment  investment  investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent incumbent incumbent incumbent              
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Table  Table  Table  Table 13 13 13 13 Profits at equilibrium at   Profits at equilibrium at   Profits at equilibrium at   Profits at equilibrium at t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, a t>0 ,h>0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f              (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       




Since profits are also function of prices, using the previous results obtained for 
equilibrium prices and their derivatives at a a a ac c c c=c  =c  =c  =c and a  a  a  af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f, the profit derivatives of each 
offer can be calculated with respect to a a a ac c c c       and a  a  a  af f f f       at a  a  a  af f f f=c =c =c =cf  f  f  f and a a a ac c c c= = = =c: c: c: c: 
 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        Rival  Rival  Rival  Rival investment investment investment investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
investment investment investment investment       
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Table  Table  Table  Table 14 14 14 14 Derivatives of profits at   Derivatives of profits at   Derivatives of profits at   Derivatives of profits at t t t t       > > > > 0  0  0  0, , , ,       h h h h       > > > >       0, a 0, a 0, a 0, ac c c c=c, a =c, a =c, a =c, af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f              (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
       





is always positive if w > h , a required condition for the 
copper market share, remains positive. This expression indicates that an increase in 
copper  access  charge  leads  to an  increase  in  the  incumbent’s  profit  and  does  not 





is always positive with  0 > h  and 0 > w  , 
an increase in FTTH access charge leads to an increase in profits for the firm which 
invested in FTTH.  
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4.2.4  Investment incentives 
 
In this subsection, the results of the payoff table are used to determine the dominant 
investment strategy for both firms.  
By combining two previous tables and using a Taylor series up to the first order, i.e.  








p p , we can obtain the profits table for       a a a ac c c c~c  ~c  ~c  ~c and a  a  a  af f f f~c ~c ~c ~cf f f f       as follow 
 
 
        No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment No rival investment        rival investment rival investment rival investment rival investment       
       
       
No  No  No  No 
incumbent  incumbent  incumbent  incumbent        
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Table  Table  Table  Table 15 15 15 15 Profits table at   Profits table at   Profits table at   Profits table at t>0 ,h>0,  t>0 ,h>0,  t>0 ,h>0,  t>0 ,h>0, with with with with a  a  a  ac  c  c  c near  near  near  near and  a and  a and  a and  af  f  f  f near near near near c  c  c  cf f f f              (  (  (  ( FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       




Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 10 10 10 10 Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for   Investment incentives for NN NN NN NN,  ,  ,  , NI, IN  NI, IN  NI, IN  NI, IN and  and  and  and II II II II as functions of   as functions of   as functions of   as functions of a a a ac c c c       and and and and       f f f f for  for  for  for t>0  t>0  t>0  t>0 ( ( ( (FTT FTT FTT FTTH H H H- - - -
service service service service- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition) ) ) )       
       
       
The lefthand region plot above indicates the following as a function of FTTH access 
charge and fixed FTTH cost:  
·  The “II II II II” region is absent. When a a a af f f f~c ~c ~c ~cf f f f, the FTTH access charge is close to 
cost, the rival prefers to buy access instead of investing in its own network. 
·  The The The The       “IN” “IN” “IN” “IN” region increases with the FTTH access charge a a a af f f f.. 
f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost        
a a a af f f f       
NN NN NN NN       
NI NI NI NI       
NI or  NI or  NI or  NI or IN IN IN IN       
f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost  f: fixed FTTH cost        
a a a af f f f       
       IN IN IN IN       
NN NN NN NN       
NI NI NI NI or IN  or IN  or IN  or IN         32 
·  The “NI NI NI NI” region a also increases with the FTTH access charge a a a af. f. f. f.. A higher 
copper access charge (a a a ac c c c>c >c >c >c) encourages the rival to invest more in FTTH 
than the incumbent. 
·   The “NN NN NN NN” region occurs for higher FTTH deployment fixed costs f f f f:  when f f f f 
is too high, neither firm invests in FTTH. 
 
If only the incumbent has the financial capacity to invest in FTTH, the righthand region 
plot  above  shows  that  the  incumbent’s  investment  incentives  increase  with  FTTH 
access charge. 
               
It  can  be  concluded  that,  in  FTTH-service-based  competition,  FTTH  investment 
incentives  are  not  as  significant  as  in  FTTH-infrastructure-based  competition.  First, 
situation II II II II, in which both firms invest, does not exist in a perfect competition (t=0) or a 
generic  situation  (t>0)  where  access  charges  are  set  at  cost  (a a a ac c c c~c  ~c  ~c  ~c  and  a   a   a   af f f f~c ~c ~c ~cf f f f).  In 
situations “IN” “IN” “IN” “IN” and “NI NI NI NI”, where only one firm invests, investment incentives increase with 
FTTH access charge.  
5  Comparison of FTTH-infrastructure-based and 
FTTH-service-based competition in terms of 
nationwide FTTH coverage and social welfare   
 
In this section, we will discuss the evolution of social welfare when consumers migrate 
from copper access network to FTTH network. To do so, the consumer surplus should 
be calculated for each of the situations “NN NN NN NN”, “NI NI NI NI”, “IN  “IN  “IN  “IN and “II” “II” “II” “II”.  
For  nationwide  FTTH  coverage,  we  assume  that  the  population  is  distributed  as  a 
concave function with respect to fixed FTTH deployment costs, f)  (   x 15 log
5
1
= , as 
shown below. 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10









Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 11 11 11 11              P P P Populations  opulations  opulations  opulations covered  covered  covered  covered as a function of fixed FTTH cost as a function of fixed FTTH cost as a function of fixed FTTH cost as a function of fixed FTTH costs s s s       
 
Where  x   is  percentage  of  population  covered  by FTTH  with  fixed  cost  f. f. f. f. With  this 
heterogeneous population distribution, part of population is in situation II II II II, part is in NI NI NI NI or 
IN IN IN IN, and part is in NN NN NN NN. We must therefore calculate the nationwide consumer surplus and 
social welfare, taking into account the population distribution for each situation (NN NN NN NN, NI,   NI,   NI,   NI, 
IN, II IN, II IN, II IN, II). 
 
Without loss of generality, we will take the case of perfect competition with t=0 in FTTH-
infrastructure-based and FTTH-service-based competition. The population is distributed   33 
between NI NI NI NI and NN NN NN NN.  1 x        is the percentage of the population covered by the rival (NI NI NI NI) and 
) 1 ( 1 x -  is the percentage of population not covered by FTTH (NN NN NN NN). 
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Where       CSt CSt CSt CSt       and Wt  Wt  Wt  Wt are respectively total nationwide consumers’ surplus and social 
welfare.  
 







NI FTTH coverage ~ ac
 
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 12 12 12 12       NI NI NI NI FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage       as a function of  as a function of  as a function of  as a function of a a a ac c c c (  (  (  (a a a af f f f=c =c =c =cf f f f=9) =9) =9) =9)       
 
The curve above indicates that the FTTH coverage by the rival in situation “NI NI NI NI” in FTTH-
infrastructure-based  competition  (blue  curve)  is  higher  than  in  FTTH-service-based 
competition (violet curve). FTTH coverage increases with copper access charge. 
 







NI FTTH coverage ~ af
 
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 13 13 13 13       NI NI NI NI FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage  FTTH coverage       as a function of  as a function of  as a function of  as a function of a a a af f f f (  (  (  (a a a ac c c c=c =c =c =c=9) =9) =9) =9)       
 
The curve above indicates that the FTTH coverage increases with FTTH access charge 
in FTTH-service-based competition. 
 
·  The curves on the right show that total social welfare in FTTH-service-based 
competition is maximized at a level of copper access charge above cost.  
 
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -i ii infra nfra nfra nfra- - - -based  based  based  based 
competition competition competition competition       
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -
based competition based competition based competition based competition       
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -i ii infra nfra nfra nfra- - - -based  based  based  based 
competition competition competition competition       
FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -
based competition based competition based competition based competition         34 
    
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 14 14 14 14       NI NI NI NI FTTH coverage in   FTTH coverage in   FTTH coverage in   FTTH coverage in FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -based based based based and   and   and   and FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure- - - -based competition based competition based competition based competition       
(see Appendix A: for IN IN IN IN FTTH coverage in FTTH-service-based and FTTH-infrastructure-
based competition) 
 
As a function of copper access charge in the x-axis and a function of FTTH access 
charge in the y-axis, the contour plot above shows the following. 
·  On the left, the contour plot shows that FTTH coverage in FTTH-service-based 
competition is very sensitive to the FTTH access charge a a a af f f f and increases with 
a a a af f f f. Coverage also increases with the copper access charge a a a ac c c c but is much less 
sensitive to a a a af f f f. 
·  On  the  right,  the  contour  plot  shows  that  FTTH  coverage  in  FTTH-
infrastructure-based competition is only sensitive to the copper access charge 
a a a ac c c c and increases with a a a ac c c c. 
 
   
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 15 15 15 15 total consumer surplus and social welfare as function  total consumer surplus and social welfare as function  total consumer surplus and social welfare as function  total consumer surplus and social welfare as functions of s of s of s of a  a  a  ac  c  c  c and and and and a  a  a  af f f f       in  in  in  in FTTH FTTH FTTH FTTH- - - -service service service service- - - -
based competition based competition based competition based competition for   for   for   for NI  NI  NI  NI FTTH coverage FTTH coverage FTTH coverage FTTH coverage       
(see Appendix B: total consumer surplus and social welfare as functions of ac and af in FTTH-
service-based competition for IN IN IN IN FTTH coverage) 
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W W W Welfare elfare elfare elfare       
Max Max Max Max       
CS CS CS CS         35 
As a function of copper access charge in x-axis and a function of FTTH access charge 
in y-axis, the contour plot above shows the following: 
·  On the left, the contour plot shows that the total consumer surplus in FTTH-
service-based  competition  decreases  with  copper  access  charge  and  is 
maximized at a level of FTTH access charge which is higher than the marginal 
cost (cf=9). 
·  On the right, the contour plot shows that total social welfare in FTTH-service-
based competition is maximized at a level of both copper and FTTH access 
charge which is higher than their marginal costs (c=9, cf=9). 
 
6  Conclusion and further research 
 
This  study  proposes  a  duopoly  model  (an  incumbent  and  a  rival)  based  on  two–
dimensional Hotelling method. By using "vertical product differentiation", we analyzed 
both  intra-  and  inter-platform  competition  (Copper-Copper  competition,  FTTH-FTTH 
competition and copper-FTTH competition). Using the description of the utility function 
of copper and fiber broadband access, Nash equilibrium can be derived in a game 
where  both  firms  compete  on  the  prices  of  copper  and  fiber  access  after  FTTH 
investment.  The  paper's  originality  consists  in  integrating  intra-platform  and  inter-
platform competition into a single model. 
 
This model shows that when consumers are segmented copper access charge has a 
significant impact on broadband consumers' migration from copper to FTTH access. 
Lower  access  charge  leads  to  a  lower  copper  price  equilibrium,  meaning  that 
consumers are encouraged to remain on copper access. To a certain extent, higher 
access charge leads to higher equilibrium prices for copper access, which encourages 
consumers to migrate toward FTTH access. 
 
In  FTTH-infrastructure-based  competition,  where  fixed  FTTH  infrastructure  costs  are 
low, both the incumbent and the rival invest. Where fixed costs are higher, the rival or 
the  incumbent  invests  alone.  Finally,  where  fixed  costs  are  very  high,  neither  firm 
invests. In areas where only one firm invests, the incumbent may invest alone in FTTH 
whatever the level of the copper access charge, provided that its FTTH network is not 
open to competitors, meaning that only the incumbent can propose an FTTH offer. The 
rival may invest alone in FTTH only with a high copper access charge. In other words, 
the  “NI NI NI NI”  area  where  only  the  rival  invests,  increases  with  copper  access  charge. 
Maximum social welfare and FTTH coverage are achieved with copper access charge 
which  are  higher  than  cost.  Their  value  depends  on  the  difference  in  consumers’ 
willingness to pay and marginal costs between copper and FTTH infrastructures.  
 
In FTTH-service-based competition, the investment incentive for both firms (area “II II II II”) is 
absent if both access charges are regulated at marginal cost level. The “NI NI NI NI” and “IN IN IN IN” 
areas, where only one firm invests, increase with the FTTH access charge. However, 
investment incentives are much less sensitive to copper access charge, which do not 
play  an  essential  role  in  investment  incentives,  unlike  in  FTTH-infrastructure-based 
competition. In order to maximize FTTH coverage, the consumer surplus and social 
welfare  within  FTTH-service-based  competition,  the  optimal  level  for  FTTH  access 
charge should be set above marginal cost. The obligation to open its FTTH network to 
competitors reduces investment incentives even in areas where only one firm invests. 
The model determines the link between copper and FTTH access charge in order to 
maximize nationwide FTTH coverage, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In the long 
run,  coverage  seems  to  be  the  most  important  parameter  because  it  is  likely  to   36 
generate more technological progress, which dramatically increases social welfare over 
time (Jeanjean, 2010). 
 
Further research will include the impact of an alternative and independent platform such 
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